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KNOCKING OVER STRAW GODS

James McLachlan

The Same Old Stuff

n onc sense this is a review that does not need to be written beca use Blake Ostler, in 1996. already reviewed the basic materials on
Mormonism that were included in See the Gods Fall. 1 But in another
sense this review needs to be written and read by Mormons because
See the Gods Fall is about other re ligious groups besides Latter-day
Sai nts and is an excellent example of how lIot to write about someonc else's beliefs. The authors admit that the chapter on Mormonism
is really just a con densed version of the same arguments already set
out in their \991 book, The Mormon Concept a/Cod. I would recommend that those interested in a head-ta-head analytic confrontation
with Beckwith and Parrish read Blake's review (it does not appear
that Beckwi th and Parrish ever seriously did). They mention it tw ice
in their chapte r on Mormonism but never confront, or even come
dose to confronting, any of the issues Ostler raises (see pp. 104, 112).

I

1. Blake T. Ostler, r~view o f The Mormon Conccpt of God: i\ Philosophical Analysis.
by Francis J. Beckwith and Stephen E. Parrish, Reyiew (If Books on the Boo.~ of Mormo71 8/2
(1996): 99-146.

Review of Francis J. Beckwith and Stephen E. Parrish. See the Gods
Fall: Four Rivals to CIJristia"ity. Joplin, Mo.: College Press. 1997.311
pp., with appendixes. $21.99.
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This is unfortunate beca use the authors claim they sought to create a
dialogue between Mormons and eva ngelicals; however, not hin g in
See the Gods Fall indicates that such a dialogue has taken place. In stead. th e chapter on Mormonism merely conde nses the material in
the first book.
In 199 1 we published a book on the Mormon concept of
God. Much of the following is an abbreviated vers ion of
what appears in that book. In response. Mormons have written a numbe r of replies. We welcome this. for one of our
purposes of publ ishing the book was to create dialogue. O ne
problem with the book was that we concerned ou rselves only
with what we now call the polytheistic view of God. which
we defended as the dominant Mormon belief on the matter,
though adm itting that not all Mormons agree with this
dominant view. Nonethel ess, we find inadequate the Mormon responses to our basic objections to Mormon theology.
(p. 109)
There is some di si ngen uou sness here. Eve n if they did find the
Mormon responses inadequate, the authors might have show n an in te rest in dialogue by ment ioning how they fou nd them in adequate.
In fact, the only response to rev iews of the first book is in the appendixes. And one of these, "Why the Classica l Co ncep t of God Is
Biblical," amounts to no more than some proof text ing with English
translations that shows the authors have no awareness of historical
and textua l arguments about any of the texts or doctrines they discuss. For exa mple. in his review Ostler challenges the au thors' citation of several Old Testamen t passages in The Mort/loti Concept of
God (i.e .• Psal m 90:2; Isa iah 40:28; 43:12- 13; 57: l 5) th at "use the
word '6/am and assume that it refers to timelessness"; howeve r, Ostler
points out that
it merely means an indefinite period of lime. It does not
mean a timeless eternity. None of the sc riptures cited by the
authors support any conclusion stronge r than that: ( I) God's
character and commitment arc stable and unchanging; (2) God
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is everlasting or has always existed; and (3) God is immune
from the ravages of time. They do not support the stronger
claim made by the authors that God transcends all temporal
succession and changes in no intrinsic properties.
Almost all biblical scholars agree that God's time is different from the time-metric of our world, but that God is in volved in a temporal relation to the world. 2
What is amaz ing is that, without mentioning Ostler's objections
and without referring to any of the associated literature, Beckwith
trots out the same passages in appendix D and uses them in exactly
the same way as in the first book, seemingly oblivious to any problems that the literature on the subject might have with his interpreta tion of <{jliim. The authors apparently did not think this was a signifi cant objection to their arguments against Mormon theology. This
type of unresponsiveness occurs again and again in the sections of
See the Gods Fall that deal with Mormonism. Pa rticularly conspicuous for its absence is a response to Ostler's discussion of frec will and
foreknowledge. The authors make no attempt at d ialogue and only
attack a straw man.
See the Gods Fall, however, is not just about Mormons. Here the
authors are after other game as well- Secular Humanists, Baha'is,
and New Age followers. Any pretense at sympathetic but critical dia logue with others from the traditions they caricature is nonexistent.
The authors set up straw gods and proceed to knock them over.
This is a shame because the authors should have something to
say. Both have doctorates in philosophy, and both are trained in the
Anglo-American analytic tradition. Besides, this book is a cut above
"anti-cult" tracts.) In fact, in the first chapter the authors criticize
other evangelical writers who commit informal fallacies in their
work. (Alas, the authors commit more than a few themselves.) The
book contains some defenses of traditional theism by William Lane
2. Ibid .• 123.
3. Mormons should not be too upst:t by being called a "cult.~ J was once in a
"Christian n bookstore in Bloomi ngton. Indiana, that included Buddhism and Hinduism
as cults. along with Mormons and others.
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Cra ig; if it were left at that I might recommend it to some of my
evangelical students here at Western Carolina Un iversi ty who arc beginn ing to think phil osoph ica ll y about their own fa ith. But the key
problem with the book is its underlying aim to perform a hatchet job
on other faiths-a bit more sophisticated than th e usual attack but,
nevertheless, a hatchet job. In fact, what bothers me most about th e
book is that it is not for so meone who seeks to learn abo ut Mormon ism, Baha'ism, Humanism, or the New Age movement-i t is
merely a book to confirm someone's already fo rmed opi nion so tha t
person does n't really need to lea rn anything signi fi cant about these
movements or why people believe fervently in them. I confront these
attitudes each day in courses [teach on world religions-sig naling an
inability to admit there might be so met hin g of eternal va lue in a nother's faith. The authors continually choose the weakest interpretation of essen tial doctrines of these traditions, claim these interpreta tions arc the esse ntial ones, and then proceed to demolish the straw
man they have created . Concepts like karma and rei ncarna tion that
figure importantly in Hinduism. Jainism. and Buddhism are misrepresented in such a way that the reader will leave with the impress ion
that he has no need to try to understand these significan t doctrines
of major world religious traditions that have spawned elaborate and
subtle philosophical commentary.
The most outrageous example o f inexcusable ignorance. and I
wo uld almost have to say willful misreadi ng, of a nothe r t radition
takes place in the chapter on New Age_ The subject is not specifically
New Age but the Hindu concept of karma, to which I will return
later. After interpreting karma in the most unsympathetic way possible
by saying that it only serves to justify the caste system, th e authors assert that Gandhi was a great humanitarian only because of his association with Christian missionaries.
Some may object to this critiqu e by pointing ou t that
Mahatma Gandhi, a believing Hindu, was a fine humanitarian.
Although this may very well be true, the objector should realize that "Gandhi ack nowledged that it was the Chri stian
missionaries and not his co- religionists who awakened in
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him a revu lsion for the caste system and for the maltreat ment of outcastcs." That is to say. Gandhi had to act incon sistently with his Hindu presuppositions and incorporate
Christian eth ics in orde r for him to be a humanitarian in the
real world. (p. 226)
f think this statement borders on crimi nal ignorance. The in credib le hubris of some Western Christians is not dead, We Christians have much to be proud of in Christ's teachings of the un iversal
brotherhood and sisterhood of humanity as children of God. and
Gand hi acknowledges this. but Ind ian traditions opposed the caste
systems long before Christianity came to India. Siddhartha Gautama
and Vardahama Ma hav ira, the founders of Buddhism and Jainism.
both opposed the caste system though they believed in the law of
karma. Gand hi 's principle of ahimsa. o r not do ing harm to others,
came primarily from Mahavira, not from Christ. Gandhi acknowledged the high moral principles of the Buddha as well. I doubt that
one can read the Hindu sutras o r the Blwgavadgita and not get a
strong sense of a great tradition of moral duty or dharma.
The equiva len t ridicu lous statement by a Hindu might be that
Ma rtin Luth er King was only a humanitarian because he had read
Gandhi. Otherwise he would have believed, as Sepulvu lda and many
Southern slaveholders thought, that Paul justifies slave ry and that the
Ch ristian doctrines of the great chain of being and predestination
justify the belief that " inferior races" are natural slaves! So King could
not, as a Chr istian, have crusaded for equa l rights. He could. however, do so through the Hindu influence on his Christ ian faith. Of
course, though King read Gandhi and borrowed much from his attitude of nonviolence, his Christian tradition undoubtedly had more
to do with his moral formatio n than the influence of Hinduism. The
explanations arc equally absurd .4
-1. Thc 3SSl" rtio ns ~ bo·. 11 Gandhi arc aClually ,"'urse Ihan I havc preSl"ntcd in the lext.
The phrase "Althuugh this nlay ve ry well be true ,. abo ut Ga ndhi's humanitarianism is
signifi ca nt fo r the autho rs, who cil e Richard Gre ni er's The Gamlhi Nabody Knows ( Nashville: Nelso n. 1983) as "a $C3thing critique of Gandhi 's perS(lI13t ethics." I SUppOSl" the im·
plicati o n is thai no Hindu could rcall y be a mo ral human being.
,H
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The book consists of an introduction, six chap ters, and five appendixes. T he first two chapte rs are the best: "The Importance of
Criti cal Thinking and Philosophy" introduces elementary logical fallacies and even shows examples in evangelical apologetics, and "The
Classical Christian Concept of God" spells out the bas ics of the classical doctrine. The presentation almost demands a serious consideration of objections such as the problem of evil, but the authors only
wish to show how theism is superior to naturalism or pantheism.
The nex t fO llf cha pters attack, with little sympa thy, the beliefs of
Mormons, Humanists, Baha'is, and New Age adherents. Although I
am a Mormon and not a Secular Humanist, Baha';, or New Age believer, I found none of the presentations of these positions to be
much more than caricatures that were easily defeated. It would be
imposs ible in a short essay to point to all of the problems, so I will
rest rict myself to th e analysis of the Hindu concepts of nondual ism
and karma in the chapte r on New Age thought and to the discuss ion
of Mormonism. But first I want to comment on what I think is a serious problem running throughout the book-the reduction of religious traditions to a single set of philosophical concepts.
How Not to Understand Someone Else's Religion

See the Gods Fall is an example of how not to write a text on COlll parative rel igion; it certainly does not represent an effort on the part
of its two authors to understand the beliefs of their targets. But in all
fairness, it is rIOt a book on comparative religion; rather, as its title indicates, it is an effort to knock its ta rge ts over. St raw men are much
easier to knock over than real ones.
One of the book's key problems is its reduction of religions to
philosophical systems. In their review of The Concept of God for the
hlternatiOllal JounwI for Philosophy of Religion, David Paulsen and
Blake Ostler made a similar c ri ticism of The Mormon Concept of
God. S Paulsen and Ostler recommended that the au thors engage in
.>. David L. Paulsen lnd Rlake T. Ostler, review of The MOrt/lOll COII{('pr vj(J(ld: A
PhilO$opltirlll Alltlyisis, by Francis J. Beckwith and Stephen E. Parrish, /mcrmlliOlwl /OlJmal
f(lr P/ri/v50phy of Rc/igion 3'> ( 1994 ): 118-20.
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dialogue with particular Mormon thinkers and not try to synthesize
Mormonism, but the authors did not listen. In some respects, however, it is not all their faul t. Wi th the exception of a few articles and a
couple of books, we Mormons have done very little to explain our religion to philosophically minded readers. Theological and philosophical interpretations of Mormonism do not abound. Latter-day Saint
scholars trained in philosophy and religion need to engage in more
discussion with philosophers and theologians of other traditions. 6
Years ago Sterling McMurrin performed both a service and a disservice to Mormons everywhere who were interested in see ing their tradition set against the backdrop of the great philosophical and theological traditions of Christianity. He gave it the unfortunate title
Theological Foundations of the Mormon Religion. McMurrin asserted
that Mormonism was inherently committed to metaphysical pluralism and the finitude of God. While I am sympathetic to much of
what McMurrin says here, there are Mormons committed to the absoluteness of God. Not all Mormons have been pluralists, and some,
such as William H. Chamberlin, the first Mormon to do formal studies in philosophy, were idealists.7
For almost a generation, many Mormons and non-Mormons
with philosophical and theological interests have gone to McMurrin's
little book for the standard interpretation of Mormon theology. It is
ironic that McMurrin's book, misleading as it is, seemed to provide a
quick reference to what Mormons believe about any philosophical or
theological issue for many people in and out of the LOS Church. But
religions-as historical entities~and religious doctrines are much
more complicated. Joseph Smith said:
I cannot believe in any of the creeds of the different denominations, because they all have some things in them I cannot subscribe to, though all of them have some truth . I want
6. David Paulsen of the BYU Philosophy Department is currently editing a book on
Mormon reactions to twentieth-century theology; this is a step in the right direction, but
more needs to be done in this respect.
7. Sterli ng M. McMurrin, Tile Theological Foundations of the Mormon Religion (Sail
Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1965), 1- 19.
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to come up into the presence of God, and lea rn all things;
but the creeds set up stakes, and say, "Hitherto shalt thou
come, and no further;" which r cannot subscribe to.8
Joseph Smith is talking about the immediate experience of the
presence of God. On the most basic level, a fund ame ntal difference
between any religion (e.g., Christ ianity or Hinduism) and any theol ogy is that the former is a religion while the latter is a type of rational
reflection on religion. This distin ctio n is also fundamental between
the LOS faith (based on revelation) and LOS theology. So the recommendation that Mormons interested in theological reflection ca n
find a tool for that refle ction in philosophy and theology must include the stipulation that philosophy and theology are rational re flection s by which we attempt to understand revelat ion and are not
necessarily revelation itself. For Mormons, revelation and theology
are compatible, but revelation is more fundamental. One of the essential claims of Mormonism is that God's revelat ion is ongoing.
Theology is our effort to explain revelation in con temporary. rational
terms. Theology not only historically foll ows the developmen t of religion, but, Mormons would also claim, is logically subsequent, is dependent on revelation. and will never exhaust revelation in explanation. Understood in this way. any LOS theological reflection would
have to be "a" Mormon theology. and never "the" Mormon theology.
This. 1 believe. is the point of continual reception of revelat ion
and rereading of the scriptures. We ca n never reduce the gospel to a
handy manual of philosoph ical doctrines. This is the basis for Joseph
Smith's disagreement with the formal formulation of creeds.
Rabbinic understanding of the Torah as a living tradition is similar to
continual revelation. as are the Hindu doctrines of Sruti and Smriti.
Sruti (what is heard) is the tradition of ancient Vedic literature, and
the Smriti (what is remembered) are sacred texts beyond the Ved ic
literature (Vedas and Upatlishads). So me Hindus regard the writings of the philosopher Sankara as sacred; others do not, but for
them the canon is open. Zen Buddhists are perhaps even cl ose r to
8. Hjjlory of Ih~ Church. 6:57.
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Joseph Smith's teachi ngs when they say that even the sc riptures do
not take one into the presence of ultimate reali ty- this can on ly happen through expe rience. The poi nt here is that living traditions are
open to revelation. This can be one of many possible points of d ialogue betwee n Latter-day Sai nts and those faithful to other religions.
Beckw ith and Parr ish seem to bel ieve tha t Christianity is reducible to one static doctrine d iscovered through a philosophica l
analysis of scripture and metaphysics. For them Ch ristianity is classi·
cal theism. Mormonism, as they view it, is not classical theis m, so
Mormons are not Chr ist ians. One m ight wo nde r how they would
classify other Christians who weren't classical theists-for example,
the mys tics Angelus Silesius, Meisler Eckhart, and Jacob Boehme; or
nontraditional the ists like G. W. F. Hegel, Gabriel Marcel, or F. W. J.
von Schelling, who all claim to be Christian. How would they catego·
rize the p rocess theologians in th is century who see God as processive (i.e., that God is capab le of change and is changed through his
relat ion to the wo rld ; this fu nda mentally opposes traditional theistic
views that God's perfection means that God cannot change), William
James, the Methodist Edgar S. Brightman (Martin Lu ther King's
teacher al Bas ion University), or the Russ ian Ort hodox theologia n
Nicolas Berdyaev. all of whom be lieved in a finite God (though in
radically different ways)?
What about theists who certainly d id not think that classical theism was correct because it reduced God to an object of philosophical
renec tion? Kierkegaard and Pascal wou ld become pseudo-Christ ians.
But then Pascal could evoke his invective about the god of Abraham,
Isaac. and Jacob and not the god o f the philosophers against Beckwith and Parrish . One also wonders about Karl Rahner's anonymous
Christ ians-are they possible in Beckwith and Parrish's view? Is right
bel ief mo re important than right pract ice? Are classica l theists like
the Muslim al -Ash<ari and the Jewish ph ilosopher Moses Mai·
monides better Ch ristians than Charles Hartshorne or Pete r Be rtocci-both finitis ts who saw themselves as Chr istians? What about
Madva, the Hindu theist? In Madva's thought Ishvara, or the Lord, is
mu ch the same as in classical Western theism. In fact, for some o f
his fol lowers the Lord is so all-powerful that we are predestined to
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salvation or damnation and grace is irresistible. In the Buddhist tradition, Shiman (in the pure-land tradition of Mahayana) takes a posi tion on grace similar to the traditional Western theist. Does this
mean that Madva and Shiman arc more "Christian" than Charles
Hartshorne, Dav id Paulsen of the BYU Philosophy Department, or
Blake Ostler? But Madva's reve latory tradition is the Sruti (" that
which was heard," the mos t ancient revelation of truth) of the Vedic
tradition and the Bhagavadgita, not the Bible. So if Beckwith and
Parrish want to excl ude Mor mons from the elite club of Christians"In the end, Mormonism can be made Christian only by ceasing to
be Mormon"- wo uld they have to include people from nooChristian trad itions as Christians (see p. 128)? Is belief in the correct
philosophical view so much more important than the pract ice or intentions of the indiv idual believers? Were I a believing Hindu Dvaita9
Vedantist (Hindu theist ), I might like the idea that Beckwith and
Parrish do not think I am go ing to hell, but I wou ld stil l consider myself a Hindu and not a Christian. As a Mormon bel iever in Jesus
Christ, I would like to consider myself a Christ ian.
This reduction of the rich traditions of phi losophical interpretations of various religious doctrines to one system is appa rent in
Beckwith and Parrish's interpretation of the doctrines of nondualism
and karma as they appea r in the chapte r on New Age. Unfortuna tely,
they never choose a strong phi losoph ical interpreta tion of the tradition they attack.

9. Dvaita ml.'ans "dual" or that God and th l.' world arc dilTl.'unL Philosophically. this
is very close to traditional theism. The foundl.'r of the Dvaita Vcdant,] s.:hool was i'>'tadvJ
(A.O. 1 t 97-1276). Advaita means "nondual" or that God and crl.'~tion arc one reality. This
is closer to the Western idea of pantheism. whi ch most (but nOt all ) Chri$lians h3\'e held
to be heretical. The Advaita Vedan ta school was founded by Sankara ( .... n. 71\8- 820). A
third Vedantist sc hool. Visistadvaita or qualified nondualism, WJS founded by RJmanug~
(A.\). 1017-]] 37). These arc three alternatives in just the Ved.mt ist tradition of I-lindu
philosophy, but among six other major tradition,]1 s.:hools of Hindu philosophy, some arc
atheistic and othl.'rs pluralistic. lkckwith and Parrish's con tention that Hinduism is
monistic shows how na']ve i~ their allcnlpl to rl.'duce religions to philn.o;ophical systems.
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Karma Cola
I cannot speak with any authority about New Age metaphysics,
but the authors discuss several Hindu concepts in their chapters on
the Baha'is and the New Age that are mistaken or oversimplified. For
example, the authors refer to Hinduism as ultimately pantheistic (see
p. 179). They admit to polytheistic elements in the Bhagal'adgita but
indicate that even so it is ultimately pantheistic. This is an example of
selective interpretation. The anomaly here is that many Hindus regard the Bhagal'adgita as theistic. It is certainly a devotional text in
which the highest form of religious activity is held to be worship of a
God, in this case Vishnu, of whom Krsna is an avatar or earthly incarnation. Hindu writers seldom use the term pantheism, but the
term has been applied by Western scholars to the idea of the divine as
it appears first in the Upanishads as Nirguna Brahman, which is Brahman (ultimate reality) without manifestations. But the Upanishads
are not univocal about this. Brahman is also referred to as Saguna
Brahman, Brahman with characteristics. or Ishvara (Lord). Brahman
as Lord (Ishvara) is hardly pantheistic and is much closer to the varieties of Christian theism. One is not clearly favored over the other in
all of the Upanishads, and the latter interpretation is clearly closer to
Western theism than to pantheism or polytheism. These religious interpretations of ultimate reality in the Vedic writings of Hinduism
are perpetuated in the six major philosophical schools. and hence no
single philosophical interpretation of Hinduism exists. In the past,
some Westerners have seen Adl'aita Vedanta as "the" Hindu philosophical system. But it is only one division in the Vedanta school of
Hindu philosophy, and the Vedanta makes up only one of the six orthodox schools of Hindu philosophy. These include widely differing
views of ultimate reality. Samkya/Yoga is atheistic and dualistic; it
posits the reality of both spirit and matter, Purusha and Prakriti.
Vaisheshika is pluralistic and primarily attempts to examine the nature of the universe. It argues that physical reality consists of invisible, indestructible atoms. This way of explaining the physical world
is used to support the Upanishadic thesis that Atman is Brahman. In
all these schools, the authority of the sacred texts of the Vedic tradition
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is upheld. Within the Vedantist school , Madva, fou nder of Dvaita
Vedanta, is an out-and -out th eist in the Western sense of the term.
Important divisions among disciples of this school even debate about
whether the Lord's grace is resistible o r irresistible. Ramanuja is a
qualified non dualist who con tends th at the sou l is the same substance as Ishvara but always diffe rent in manifestation. Sankara's fa mous Advaita Vedanta system, though popular, is the only thoroughgoing monism among Hindu philosophical systems, yet in the West
the popul ar conception is that all of Hinduism, not just philosophi cal Hinduism, is monistic. to Advaita Vedanta is the only system that
could really be cons idered pantheist ic, th ough they refer to themselves as nondualists.
But even if we consider pantheism as a philosophical position,
the authors make serious mistakes of interpretation. For ex:ample. in
their discussion of the Baha'is the authors attack the doctrine of emanation ism, a type of pantheism, with an argumen t from William
Lane Craig that appea rs several tim es in See the Gods Fall. Craig argues against everlasting time and for the impossibility of an infinite
series. I am not concerned with whether or not Craig's arguments
work in general. But they simply do not work against an emanationist system. Emanationists. like classical theists, do not argue for infinite time. For emanationists, like th e neo- Platonist Plotinus (who
had a profound influence on early Ch ristian philosophers), time
comes into ex:istence with the world. Most emanationists simply do
not hold that time is eternaL
Continuing their arguments against pantheism, Beckwith an d
Parrish wonder how, if we are all part of God, any of us can possibly
make a mistake. They quote the great twentieth -century Hindu philosopher Sarvepali Radahkrishan, who says: "How do we manage to
deceive ourselves into seeing a transformation and a plurality, where
in reality Brahman [God] is alone?" On this '''no information' is possible" (p. 211 ). Beckwith and Parrish think that this is an appeal to
mystery in the worst sense of the term. merely to hide logical in co 10. Michael C. Brannigan, The Pulse ofWi5dom: The Philo50p~jt5 of India, ChilUl, and
/a{Xln (NcwYork: Wordsworth, 1995), 14-17.
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herence (sec p. 2 1 1). I agree with the authors that pantheistic philosophy or nondualist inte rpretations of reali ty have particular difficulties explaining why plurality ca me about in the fi rst place. But I find
mon ists' appeals to mystery no more baffling than claims by traditional classical theists that a God who has no need of the world because it adds nothing to his eternal perfect ion decides, neve rtheless,
to create a world in which a significant portion of his creation will be
eternally damned . Accord ing to them, God knows that it wi ll be so
from eternity. Yet this eternally good and per fect being goes ahead
and creates the wo rld anyway. In both cases, the emergence of plurality from the initial monism seems quite arbit rary.
The next argumen t agains t pantheism is tha t, in it, mora l judgment is ultimately illusory. According to th is argument, since for God
all plural it y is ultimately unreal, no basis fo r mak ing distinc tions between good and evil rema ins. Here Beckwith and Pa rrish ci te a story
from Francis Schaeffer.
One day I was talking to a group of people in the digs of
a young Sout h African in Cambridge. Among others, there
was present a you ng Ind ian who was of Sikh backgrou nd but
a Hindu by religion. He sta rted to speak strongly agai nst
Christ ianity, but d id not really understand the problems of
his own beliefs. So I said, "Am I not correct in saying that on
the basis of your system, cruelty and non-cruelty are ult imately equal, that there is no intrinsic difference between
them?" I-Ie agreed. They who listened knew him as a del ightful person, an "E nglish ge ntleman" of the very best kind,
[andllooked up in amazement. But the student, in whose
room we met, who had clearly understood the implications
of what the Sikh had admitted, picked up his kett.le of bo iling
wate r with which he was about to make tea, and stood with it
steam ing over the In dian's head. The man loo ked up and
asked him what he was doing and he sa id, with a cold but
gentle finality, "There is no difference between c ru elty and
non-cruelty." Thereupon the Hindu walked out into the
n;ght. (p. 212)
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The authors quote this story with delight and clea rly agree th at
this shows that a nondualist Hindu cannot argue co nsistently against
immoral acts like cruelty. It is too bad that the young Hindu d id not
know his tradition well enough to respond. Assert ing, as nondualists
do, that good and evil are not ult ima tely real does not mean that a
Hindu nondualist condones evil activity in this world of appearances,
o nly that such acts are not eternally real. In fac t nondualist Hindus
argue that immora l ac ts usually arise fro m ou r egoism, through
which we have a distorted idea of our own pos it ion in being. An ev il
person sees him self as ultimately more impo rtant than others, so he
thinks he can use them as he wishes. What the evil egoist fails to realize is that he will pass from existencc; he is not ultimately real. No
Hindu would argue that cruelty in the realm of appea ranccs is just ified. Morality, like good and ev i\' is a part of th is realm. As ind ividuals, it is real enough for us. Schaeffer, in his delight at scori ng a point
in debate, clearly lost an opport unit y to understand why the you ng
man believed as he did. J do agree that there is a difficulty for
monists who see ultima te real ity as beyond good and evil, but the
great irony of the story is that traditional theists fi nd themselves in
the same situation on this question as pantheists. Cons ider the following long passage from Augustine's Confessions, in which the au thor addresses God:

9
I was told that we do evil because we choose to do so of
o ur own free will , and suffer it because your justice right ly
demands that we shou ld. I did my best to understand this,
but I cou ld not sec it clea rl y....
But then I would ask myself once more: "Who made me?
Surely it was my God, who is not o nl y good but Goodness itself. How, then, do I come to possess a will that (an choose to
do wrong and refuse to do good, thereby providing a just
reason why I shoul d be punished? Who put this will into me?
Who sowed this seed of bitterness in me, when all that I am
was made by my God, who is Sweetness itself? If it was the
devil who put it there, who made the devil? If he was a good
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angel who became a devil because of his own wicked will,
how did he come to possess the wicked will which made him
a devil, when the Creator, who is entirely good, made him a
good angel and nothing else?" ...
\I

Also I considered all the other things that are of a lower
order than yourself, and I saw that they have not absolute being in themselves, nor are they entirely without being. They
are real in so far as they have their being from you, but unreal in the sense that they are not what you are. For it is only
that which remains in being without change that truly is. As
for me, 1 know no other content but clinging to God, because
unless my being remains in him, it cannot remain in me. But
himself ever unchanged. he makes all things new. I own him as
my God; he has no need of aught that is mine. ...
!3
For you evil does not exist, ... because there is nothing
outside it which could invade it and break down the order
which you have imposed on it. Yet in separate parts of your
creation there are some things which we think of as evil because they are at va riance with other things. But there are
other things again with which they are in accord, and then
they are good. In themselves, too, they are good. And all
these things which are at variance with one another are in
accord with the lower part of creation which we call the
earth. The sky, which is cloudy and windy, suits the earth to
which it belongs. So it would be wrong for me to wish that
these earthly things did not exist, for even if I saw nothing
but them, I might wish for something better, but still I ought
to praise you for them alone.... 0 God, for you are the God
of us all. ll

I]. SI. AlIgllstint. Confessions 7, trans. R. S. Pint-Coffin {HarmondswOrlh, England:
Ptnguin Books, 1961). 136-49.
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In this remarkable passage. Augustine attempts to deal with one
of the most difficuJt problems facing classical theists. the problem of
evil. Why did a good God create a world in which there is so much
suffering and evil? The first response is that human frec will brought
about evil. but Augustine realizes that ultimately this does not work.
For God, in eternity. knew perfectly that humanity would rebel when
it was created. It does not help the classical theist's cause to bring in
Satan and the fallen angels, for they too were created by a God who
knew from eternity that they would rebel. It does not help to say that
God created them free and could not prevent them from rebellion
because this would be a limit on God's omnipotence. Further, it does
not help to say that God limited his omnipotence so we could act
because God knew from eternity that certain ones of us would be
damned, and since God is perfect from eternity it cannot be argued
that God created the world out of some irresistible need. We add
nothing to the classical God, who is perfect without us. So beyond
the free will defense, Augustine had to come up with something else.
The something else is the aesthetic defense that appears in para graphs I I and 13. God's creation is of a lower order of being than
God. It is less real than God and it is in this order of being that we
can talk about good and evil. But from God 's point of view the whole
is good. Even hell is a part of God's creation and part of the aesthetic
balance of the whole. This justifies doctrines of predestination because for God the whole is good, and, if I am predestined to hell. that
is good from God 's ultimate point of view as well, though not from
mine. So just as Brahman is beyond good and evil for the nondualist
Hindu and the pantheist, God is beyond good and evil for the classical theist. The Russian orthodox theologian Nicolas Berdyaev would
call this "the profound moral source of atheism:' and. throughout the
modern period, philosophers and literary figures like Pierre Bayle,
Voltaire. Mark Twain, G. W. F. Hegel, F. W. J. von Schelling, F. M.
Dostoeveky, Edgar s. Brightman. Albert Camus, and many others,
believers and atheists alike, have attacked it. 12
12. Nirolas 8trdyaev. The Destiny of Mall, trans. NalaJie Duddington (New York: Scrib·
ners, 1937), 32. S« Albtrl Camus, The Rebel (New York: Knopf, 1954), 23-25.
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I will co mplete this long dive rge nce into Hinduism with a consi deration of the way the autho rs handle the Hindu, Jain, and Buddhist doctr ine(s) of karma. Basically, these traditions bel ieve that
peop le a re cont inually born again to lives of varied fo rtune according
to the moral quality of their accumu lated deeds. We can make four
basic points about kar ma:
I. In the most rudimentary sense, karma means action.
2. In ethical d iscussions, karma is an action that is morally im po rt ant because it is eithe r pro hibi ted or requ ired by dharma (the
moral and social o rder of things).
3. Il is a n unseen fo rce generated by du tiful o r undutiful action.
4. The law operates like a law o f nature and is completely impe rsonal.
Beckwith an d Parrish o ffer seven objections to the doct rine of
karma and reincarnation. In the interest of space, I wish to d iscuss
o nl y three. The first is that it does not help with a solut ion to the
problem of evi l because it only gives us an infin ite regress (see pp.
217-20). Ba sically, the authors assert that saying past lives determine
the present one does not explain why evil arises in the first pl ace. The
second is that the d octrine impedes mo ral progress because any in tervention in the life of another wou ld inte rfere with cosmic judgment and impede the progress of that person toward moksha (liberation) (see pp. 225--26). Roughly, the authors are sayi ng that since one
deserves hi s place in the world, we should not interfe re. The fina l
claim is that karma con flicts with free will (see pp. 227-28). The au thors think that the doctrine is fatalistic in that one's position in the
world might be determined by previous lives.
I. Karma and reincarnatiOtl do tlot explain the origitl of good
and evil. Consider the fo llowing from the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad
IVA.5,

Acco rding as o ne acts, according as o ne conducts him self, so does he become. The doer of good becomes good.
The doer of evil becomes ev il. O ne becomes virtuous by virtuous aC lion, bad by bad action .
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But people say: "A person is made I not of acts, bu t ] of
desires only." [I n reply to this ! say:] As is his desi re, such is
his resolve; as is his resolve, such the action he pe rforms; what
action (karma) he pe rforms. that he procures fo r himsel f.1 3

If the doctr ine of karma is an attempt to expla in the origin o f
good and evil. it does so by placing the origi n in free will. Good and
ev il arise from actions tha t arc eit her dutiful or unduti fu l. Hindu.
Buddh ist, and Ja in thinkers. who are as diverse as Western philosophe rs on this poin t, do not genera lly seem to try to explain freedom
causally fo r, as Chr istian theist S0ren Kierkegaard points out in TIle
Concept of Anxiety, such a co mplete causal explanation of freedom
would eliminate freedom by ma king it merely mechanical or a pa ri
of a causal chai n .l~ For example, if I reduce my choice to remain a
Mormon Christ ian-in a world whe re there is much temptation to
leave religion- to my social cond it ioning and my genes, there never
was a choice in the first place. Any co mplete explanat ion of free
choice explains free choice away. The ultimate origin of evil, for those
who believe in karma (a nd for theists of all kinds), lies in rebell ion,
and the possibil it y of rebell ion and ev il lies in freedom.
2 an d 3. The doctrines of karma and reincamatioll impede moral
progress and are incompatible witll free will. I believe that these two
claims belong together because Hindus, Buddhists, and Jains have all
argued that karma is bound up wit h an idea of mo ral progress and
free wil l. Beckwith and Parrish believe that if one bel ieves in karma
and re incarna tion, he o r she will look at the ot her as descrv ing his
position in society. Karma and reincarnation have been used to justify the caste system. differences between rich and poor, the sick and
healthy, eve n the good looking and the ugly. But Hind us ge nerally
bel ieve that we are the masters of our destiny and even if we are born
into a particula r caste we can use ou r freedom to affect ou r fut ure. Of
13. Robert E. Hume, Tile T/rirlcc" PrincipiI! Upuni,hmis ( 1921, reprint. Oxford:
Oxford University Press. (971). 140.
11. S0ren KierkegaHd, The Concept of Anxiety: A SimpJr 1'5yclw!"f!.i((ll/y Oricutiuf!.
Deli/taatiOll on tire Dogmlllic {55!'C of Here./il<lry Sin, trans. Reidar Thomte (Princelon:
Princeton Universi ty Prfss, 1980}.41-46.
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co urse, this ca n be seen as a type of social control. 1 am a Sudra
(worker) in this life. I may be a Brahmin (p riest) later. so I will be
good and follow my duties as a worker in hopes of a better rebirth.
But then Marxists have said the same of th e Christian belief in
heaven. that it is otherworldly. Remember the IWW poet Joe Hill's
lines: "Work and pray and eat hay and you'U have pie in the sky when
you die." Marxists and socially active atheists have always complained
that the Ch ristian ideal of heaven and the afterlife impedes social action, sin ce people accept the condition of the world in which they
live in hopes of a shining place in the world to come. Th ough it is
certa inly true that so me Christians have viewed the world this way,
one can also see belief in th e heavenly ideal as a call to perso nal action and moral perfection beca use we can believe that the ideal is
possible. The sa me is true for Eastern notions of karma and reinca rnation. Beckwith and Parrish arb itrarily see only the positive interpretation for Christians and only the negative view for Hindus. This
inconsistency is just not fair.
While it is true that the concepts of karma and caste appear in
India at approximately the same time (about the sixth century s.c.).
it would be committing the geneti c fallacy to view the two as absolutely connected. At about the same time Siddhartha Gautama, the
Buddha. and Vardamana Mahavira , th e great Jain leader, also appear
on the sce ne. Both accept the doctrine of karma and rebirth, but
both vehemently reject the caste sys tem. Both also reject monistic
metaphys ics (as do many Hindus). 1ains are metaphysical pluralists.
The Buddha seems almost a pragmatist who is concerned not with
metaphysical speculation but only with the origin of and end to suffering. For both, freedom for moral choice was important. Mahavira
rejected the fatalism of his companion Goshala. The Buddha thought
that karma co uld be overcome in this life by a complete change of
heart.
Karma is not determinism; it can be interpreted existentially as
sit uational. I am free because I am in a situation that offers me
cho ices. In fact, in Hinduism generally it is only as a human being
that I can bring about karma. If I were to be reincarnated on another
plane or as an animal, karma would be spent but not created. The

138 • FARMS

REVIEW OF BoOKS

12/2 (2000)

very essence of the doctrine relates to moral and ethical decisions.
Only human beings possess the reason and free will that makes for
moral and immoral behavior. Only humans experience moksha, the
liberation from the cycle of samsara, which is the realization of total
freedom.ls In the great Hindu epic the RdmaytlT}a, the poet Tulasidas
writes:
It is a great and good fortune that you have secured a
human body, which-as all the scriptures declare-is difficult even for heavenly beings to attain. It is a tabernacle su itable for spiritual discipline and the gateway to liberation. 16
The problem is that so few of us seek liberation. Rather, we indulge ourselves in sensual pleasure. Hinduism envisages the world as
a vast moral stage. Karma is generated by voluntary action and so is
quite compa tible with free will. In fact, it assumes free will. The
eq uivalent would be to say that the LOS doctrine of premortal existence is deterministic when actually most Mormons would argue
that it is necessary for our understanding of human freedom. I was
not just handed freedom from a God who created me ex nihi/o. (It is
not clear to me that such a concept ion of freedom makes se nse, because freedom seems to have to relate to some minimal se nse of selfcausation.)' ? I am rooted in my freedom, which is based in a situation that was created in part by my own actions in the premortal life.
Does the doctrine explain freedom? No. But then, to explain freedom
is to explain it away. Hindus know better than to do this and so do
Mormons.

15. Brannigan, The Pulse ofWiulom, 257.
16, Anantanand Rambacha n. " Hinduism,~ in Humllll Nature 111111 Desriny, ed. Jean
Holm and John Bowker (Lo ndon: Pinter, 1994),71.
17. Bernard Bosanquet, the great nineteenth-century British idealist, had a profound
respect for relig ion but rejected classical theism and the doctrine of creation from nothing because: he found contradictory the conception of a Creator of creators, He saw that
classical theism is Simply incompatible with any strong doctrine of human freedom. He
argued thaI ~ IO will a will is to will its detail. Bernard Bosanquet, The Vallie Iltrd DestillY
of rhe Individual (New York: Krau s Reprint, 1968), 136.
H
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For LDS reade rs this long dive rgence into Eastern doctrines of
ka rma may have see med unn eces~a r y. I have claimed that part of the
problem with Beckwith and Parrish 's interp retation of Mormonism
lies in th e spa rseness of Mormo n philosoph ical literature. But Ihis is
not the case with Eastern doctrines of karma, rei ncarnation , a nd
nondualism or with Hindu conceptions of the divine. What it indicates is the repeated tendency in See the Cods Fall to set up straw men
by taking the wea kest possible interpretation of a particu lar doctrine
and then arguing agai nst it.
The Mormon "System"
Blake Ostler notes a flagrant case of the above tendency in his excellent rev iew essay of the a uthors' The Mormon Concept of God; here
he c ritiques their di scussion of free will and God's fore knowledge.
First, the authors show the all -pe rvasive ten dency of asserting that
Mormonism, as a rel igion, can be reduced to a si ngle philosophical
system by asserting that Mormons all believe that God's foreknowl edge is limited (see p. 27). This despite the fact that in one of the
most readily ava ilable sources on Mormonism. The Encyclopedia of
Mormonism, James Faulconer notes that most Mormo ns have taken
the positi on that God's foreknowle dge is not limited. "Historically,
most Latte r-day Sa ints have taken the first genera l position: everythin g is foresee n and free dom remains. Some have taken the second,
that God's foreknowl edge is not absolute."'8
Instead of arguing with particula r Mormon thinkers, the authors
reduce Mormonism to a sin gle philosophica l system, not admitting
the poss ibility that many Mormon s unde rstand these doctrines quite
differently.'9
18. h mes Faulconer, "Foreknowledge of God," in Encyclopedia of Mormonism, 2:52 1.
19. Ostler moves on to identify another cha ra cteristic found in bo th books, the tende ncy to create and then attack straw men. Ostler himself favors the position that God's
foreknowlooge is no t absolute. He notes thatlhe au thors put forth an incredibly weak argument in favor of limi ted fOieknowledge and then procted to knock il dow n. The prob.
lem is, as Ostler nOles, that no o ne has e,·er put forward Ihe argument that they attr ibule
to "SOllie' Mormon th inke' lsn and, what is wo rse, they attri bute it to him! OStler th en
proceeds to offe r the fo llowing argum ent abo ut the incompatibility of freedom and
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According to Beckwith and Parrish, Mormonism is a single philosophi ca l system and Mormons are thoroughgoing materia lis ts (see
p. 100). Again, con flatin g religions with philosophical systems that
are related to religions creates difficulties. Religions spawn di ffe rent
philosoph ical systems that attempt to rationally unfold the mea ning
of the revelat ion s and founding statements of the various tradit ions.
This is especially tru e for Latter-day Saints. Mormon philosophers do
not generally think that their philosophical systems are more fou n dati onal to LDS belief than revelation. On the ques ti on of whether
Mormons are materialists, the scri ptu res indicate that "There is no
such thing as immaterial matter. All spirit is matter, but it is more
fine or pure, and can only be discerned by purer eyes; We can not see
foreknowle dge, whic h, he notes, is one of the most diSCU5S<'d issucs in the philosophy of
religion over thc last thiny ycus:
I. It has always becn truc that I will sin tomorrow. (Ass umption: Qmnitemporality
of Trlll h)
2. It is impossible that God shou ld hold a false belief Of fail to know any truth.
(Assumption: Infallible F<lreknowle<lge)
3. God has always belicvcd that' will sin tomorrow. (From 1 and 2)
4. If God has always believed a « rt ain thing, thcn it is not in anyon c's powcr to do
anything whic h cn tails that God has not always bdicvcd that th ing. (Assumption:
Fixed Past)
S. It is nOt in my power to do anything that en tails that God has not always hdi~vcd
that ' will sin tomorrow. (From 3 and 4)
6. That I rdrain from si nni ng tomorrow entails th~t God has not always believcd
thJt I will si n to morrow. (Ncccssary trut h and from 2: Prindplc of Transfer of
Powcrlessness)
7. Therefore, it is not in my power to refrain from sinning tomorrow. (From 5 and
6)

8. If I act frcely when [sin tomorrow, thcn I also have it within my power to refrain
from si nning. (Assumption of Libertarian Frcc Will)
Thl'rcforc, I do not act freely when I sin tomorrow. (From 7 and 3)(!;ol'~ Ostler, re·
vicw of TIle Mormon Concepl of God, 109 n. 15)
Ostler, in his review of The MOrl/rOIl QIII((/,1 aIGOII, lOS, 109, notes that a fullcr discussion of thc argument can be found in William Hasker, God, Time, <III/I Klrow/edge
(I thaca: Cornell Unive rsity '>ress, 1989), chap. 2: see also lohn M. Fisher, !:d., God,
Foreknowledge. and Fn:edom (Stanford: Stanfo rd University Press, 1989): Nelson Pike,
~A Latter-day Loo k at th e Forcknowledge Problem," ilHcfllUliotUlI joumu/ for rlre
Plrilosoplryol Religion 33 (1993): 129-64: lohn M. Fischer, "Recent Work on God and
Freedom," Atuericull PhilosophiCliI QIWrII:riy 2912 (April 1992): 9 1- 109.
9.
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it ; bu t when our bod ies are purified we shall see that it is all matter"
(O&C 131 :7-8) . What this means philosophically is open to interpretation. thou gh it certainly eliminates the idea of immateria l substa nce. Many Mormon thinkers like B. H. Roberts and Orso n Pratt
have considered themselves ma terialists, but it is clear that they were
not materialists in the sa me se nse that Volta ire o r Karl Ma rx were.
Additionally, not all Mo rmons who have thought philosoph ically
about Mormoni sm are or have been philosophica l materialists.
Mormons maintain that there is a priority of moral over mate rial
values in the universe. The first professiona ll y trained LOS phi loso pher, W. H. Chamberlin , was an idealist in the German and Ame rican
tradition. A case can be made for idealism in Mor monism. Th is is of
course not the berkeleyean ideal ism that Orson Pratt argued against
Ostler goes on to discuss exa m ples of God's lim ited foreknowledge in the scriptures
and puts fo rward the followillg five points:
I. God is o m niscient in the sense that he knows all that can be known, but it is logica ll y im possible to know futll re acts that arc free.
2. God knows all possibilities, includ ing the present probability of any futll re event.
3. God knows now wh~1 his purposes arc and that he will achieve th~m.
4. God does not know now, in every case, precisely which contingent possibility will
be chosen o r becomc ac tual.
5. God knows now how he will respond to whichever contingent possibility occ urs
to ensure the realil.3 tio n of his purposes. (ibid., Ill )
He co ntin ues to point out the diffe rent senses of God·s foreknowledge in scri pture-.
I. Pre-dicrimJ$ which God will bring ubout rIJrouglJ his own power regu rdless ofhll/mlrJ
decisiom. (Thi s docs not mean that God needs to know each human a(!ion befo rehand.) In fact these will be accomplished rega rdless of human rebelHon. An
example would be that God will get someo ne else if Josep h Smith should fa il.
2. Com/iriotJal prophecif$. Jonah is an example; see also Jeremiah 18:7- 10: HJf at any
time [ declare conce rnin g a na tion or kingdom, th at I will pluck lip and break
dow n and deslrOY it, and if that nation concerning whi, h [ ha\·e spoken turns
from eviL I will re pen t of the evil which [intended to do it ~ (see also 2 Ne phi
1:7).

3. ProplJecies of ilJ(villlhie cOUJ(<lucnCC$ offactoH already present.
4. Absolute ekcriotJ 4 IJlJl iOIl5 ami colI/lirionai electioll of imlivi,iuais. (ibid., 11 1-13,
not all verbatim)
[ 3pologi1.e fo r the lengthy q uota ti ons, but 1 thi nk that Ostler's argu ments are so
devastati ng to [kckwith and Parrish·s claims in The MormQlI COllcept of God that 1 find it
astound ing that they could dismiss them with the single senten ce, "Nonetheless, we find
inadeq uate the Mormon f('Sponses to our basic objectio ns to Mormon theo l ogy~ (p. 109).
And yet they st ill assert Ihat the purpose of the fi rst book was to crea te dialogue.
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but thc Ge rman tradition that included Kant, Schel ling, an d Hegel
and, in America, Chamberlin's teachers, Josia h Royce at Harvard and
George Holmes Howison at California .
Chamberli n's idea lism was based on the assumption that a Mormo n view of the universe should be an ethical view in which matter
is subject to moral and religious concerns. Cha mberlin was an idealist if by idealism one means th at mind is fu ndamen tal in the world
and there is no rea lity that is not suppl emen ted or connected wi th
mental activity. But if idealism is taken to be the denial of the objective world, then Chamberlin was not an idealist. He explained his position between idealism and rea lism in the fo llowing terms:
On this view Rea lism and tradi tional Idea lism are half
truths. Real ism is right in asserting that the being of se nsedata is not entirely depende nt on their bei ng pe rceived, but
wrong in so far as it asse rt s th at they are a type of objects
whose being is quite independen t of perception . Idealism, on
the other hand is right in maint aini ng that if se nse-data arc
to be at all , they mu st be pe rce ived, but wro ng in mai ntain ing their being perce ived is the on ly cond it ion of their being.
The reconcil iation is effected by regarding both the existence
of pe rcipient subject and also the existence of some other en tity or entities as necessa ry condit ions of the being o f sensedata. The latter are th e appearance of someth in g 10 so mething else. 2o
Chamberlin's position is sim il ar to Hegel's; it is a dialectical ph ilosophy that refers to a process of becoming, of developing more and
more adequate understand ings or the world around us. If idea li sm is
understood as the reduction of concretes to ideas, it is one-sided and
in correct, but a materialismlrealism tbat claims that material enti ties
are completely independent of mind, or that mind is completely dependent on materiality, is also in adequate. A dialectical philosop hy
proceeds fro m the premise that reality is a "u nit y of opposites."
20. Ralph V. Cha mberlin . Tile Life
Ci ty: Deseret News, 1925).298.
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"Matter" is, after all, an idea, but ideas are also related to minds and
bodies. Chamberlin's dia lectical understanding of real ity also shows
the strength of LDS conceptions of God.
Dialectical Theism vs. Classical Theism
In appendix B to See the Gods Fall, Francis Beckwith discusses
the rejection of a paper he wrote on the Mormon idea of God, which
he wished to present at th e intermountain regional meeting of the
Society of Christian Ph ilosophers. The title of this appendix, "What
Does Jerusalem Have to Do with Provo?" is a play on Tertullian's famous question: "What does Jerusalem have to do with Athens?"
Tertullian's response was "nothin g." Considering that this statement
is by a philosopher who believed God had a body and th at the soul
was material and who came to be judged by traditional Christians as
a heretic. it is probably not the best choice of title for Beckwith's
po int. 2 1 He begins the appendix by discussing the ecu menical characte r of the Society of Christian Philosophers and quotes th e SCP's
statement of purpose. "The society is broadly ec umen ical in composition with respect to Ch ristian denominations, theological perspec tive, and philosophical orientatio n. Membership is open to any
person who classifies himself/herself as both a philosopher and a
Christian." Then he goes o n to lament that such a vague pronouncement will admit all sorts of undesirable elements.
As a member of the SCP-as well as so meone who has
st udied the majo r cults in America-I have long feared that
21. Ekckwith's use of th~ ti tle is u n int~ntionaJly ironic in several ways. Tertullian
(A.O. 160-220) was opposed to the interpretation of Christian revelation Ihrough the use
o f Greek philosophical categories. He was an ir rationalist who saw the rationalization of
Christianity as a matter of fait h. Tertullian was also a materialist who held th~ material
concepti on of th~ soul and believed thai God had a body-much more subde than our
own, but a body. Tertul1ian eventually became a "heretic," joining the Montanist movement (w hich flourished from A.D. 150-70). Montanus claimed to re~ivc revelation. In
shon . by Beckwith's standards, Tertullian was a dangerous pseudO-Christian cultist who
would not be admissable to the Society of Christian l'hilo.sophers; see !:tienne Gilson, La
philo50phie (lU moyen age (Paris: Payol, 1976),97-99.
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the society's vague statement of faith would allow pseudoChristian religious bodies to join and use its prestige to gain
mainstream legitimacy. (p. 247)
Beckw ith then writes that his fears were realized when his paper submitted for the meetings at Brigham Young University was rejected. In
Beckwith's view, Mormons are, of cou rse, a pseudo -Ch ristia n group
seeking legitimacy, and he wanted to atte nd the meetin g and point
this out to them and the rest of the Society of Chr ist ian
Philosophers. The last line of the section of See the Gods Fall that
deals with Mormonism reads, "In the end. Mormonism can be made
Ch rist ian only by ceasing to be Mormon" (p. 128).22
The aut hors base the exclusion of Mormons as Christian and
their exile to the status of pseudo-Christian largely on the claim that
to be a Christian one must be a classical theist. But you ca n exclude a
good many more Chr istian s besides Tertullian and the Mormons if
you choose to follow Beckwith and Parrish. John Macquarrie notes
that classical theists have long monopoli zed the term theism to the
exclus ion of other, and perhaps better, understandings of it.
There may be other and better ways of conceiving God. wh ich
is also to say that there may be other and better fo rms of theism than the classical one. I say this deliberately, because
classical theists are often inclined to monopolize the term
"theism': and to deny that those who have departed from the
classic formulat ions are rea ll y theist at all. For instance, not
only Till ich but even Whitehead have been branded as "atheists". This seems to be quite ridiculous. These men, let us

22. Of cou rse, as FARMS readefS are aware, il is far from clear historically that early
Christia ns were classical theists. II has often bee n argued that classical theism has much
mort to do with Athens's notion of Slat k impf!:rsonat ptrfeclion than lerusalem's passionate God. There afe many books on this problem. Among the recent enlfies afe Ge rhard
May, Cre/Hip ex Nihi!o: Tire Doc/rim! of "Creation Out of Nothing:· trans. A. S. Worrall
(Edinburgh: Clark, (994 ); and Bart D. Ehrman, Tile Or/hollox Corrup tion of Scripwre:
"/'he Effect of Enr!y Chris/%gica/ CQ7UfOVe r5ics 011 /he Text of till: New 1£5lamenl (New
York: Oxford Universi ty l'ress, I99J ).
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agree, were not cl assical theists, and possibly their ideas of
God are theoretically defective at various points. But it was
certainly their intention to expound a doctrine of God, and
their formulations were backed in each case by genu ine religious sentiment. An interpreter has a duty to be as sympathetic as possible in his inte rp retation, and no one with a
shred of sympathy would ca ll either Tillich or Whitehead an
atheistP
Like Latter-day Sain ts, process theists like Whitehead, existen tialists
like Tillich and Berdyaev, finitists like James and Brightman, and
idealists like Howison have been b randed as "a theists," "non Ch ristians," and "polytheists" because they disagree-largely on the
problem of evil- with classical theism.
Macquarrie argues thai no matter how carefully it is crafted, classical theism tends to present a " monarchial" view of God. God is
one-s idedly transcendent, separate, over and above the world. God
stands apart from the world, unaffected in his stony perfection by either the suffe rin g or successes of his creatures. From a Mormon
po in t of view I would add that these creatures are on ly metaphorically and analogically his chi ldren. Macquarrie continues that our
conception of God needs to be more dialectical, which means that
our idea of God needs to include immanence as well as transcendence, dependence as well as indepcndence.24
The doctrine of creario ex nihilo is intended to protect God's omnipotence, but it also places God outside the world. The wo rld exists
only as long as God wills it, and there is no need ror God to will the
world; the only necess it y is that God will himself. The world's existence is completely cont ingent wh ile God is completely independent.
In classical theism God acts on the world, but the world does not act
on God. God affects the world but is not affected by it. Nothing is
added to God in the crea tion of the world, and if the world were to
23. John Macquarrie. III Scurch of Deily: All Ess(ly jll Di(l/eCliCtl/ Theism {New York:
Crossroad, 1985 ), 43-14.
24. tbid., 31.
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disappear nothing would be lost from God. This is a one-sided and
nondialectical view of God. The world minus God = 0; God minus
the world = God. The proble m here is that if there is no need for
God to have willed the world the n we a re back to Augustine's God
who crea tes a world filled wi th suffe rin g and evi l in which some of
his creations will be eternally damned, and because he is o m n iscient
he kn ows they will be damned for etern it y but goes ahead anyway
and free ly creates the world. He did not need to create but freely wills
to crea te a world filled w ith suffering and e ternal da mnat ion for a
significant number of his "children." In Augustine's aesthetic defense.
he must say that evil is not real fo r God. for if he does n't say that
then God is also the author of evil. Classica l theism is in a worse posit io n than nondualistic or panth eist conceptions o f reality because
at least in them creation is no t the act of a personal be ing who has
moral goodness as one att ribute.
Another sign ifica nt problem with the classica l view is that God
is held to be a person. Bu t to be a person as normally understood is
to have a relationship with o the rs. Classica l Christian the ism at~
tempts to ci rcumvent th is problem with the doct rine of th e Trinity.
Mem bers o f th e Godhead relate to each othe r. But be ing a pe rson is
also a moral relationship. and it is di ffi cu lt to imagine a mo ral relationship in which one or some of the persons have no obligation to
the others. Bu t if God had a mo ral obliga ti on to creatures. they
would also be necessary beings. God would cease to be the only necessa ry being. God wo uld not be completely independe nt . not com pletely transcendent. Par t of the traged y of Mary Shelley's Frallken stein is that D r. Fra nkenstein refuses to recognize his responsib il ity to
the monster that is his creation. Morally, God wou ld have to be affected by the crealures. Does the wo rld make no difference to God? If
God would be unaffected by the wo rld 's ceasin g to exist, what was
the point of creating the world in the first place?2S Even if one were to
claim, as did Sanka ra, the Hindu philosopher, that the wo rld is d ivine
sport, even then God is amused by the world and thu s affected by it.
Bu l as Ramanllja pointed out in his critique of Sankara. a lover must
25. Ibid., 40.
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have a beloved. The relation implies the necessity of the other. If the
crea tio n of the world is on ly an arbitrar y act of God, Macquarrie
asks, what is the difference betwee n this and atheism?26
In dialectical theism, God and the world presuppose each other.
Crea tivity is not reserved exclusively fo r God. God does not create
unilaterally but calls others to create themselves, and in turn God is
created in relation to them. It seems to me that on this point Mormonism differs from traditional theologies and rese mbles the more
nontraditional , dialectical theism of idealists, some existentialists,
and the process theologia ns. In process theology and in the writings
of dialectical theologians. God is the great artist creating beauty out
of the chaotic world. The eternal cosm ic ideal entails God's reciprocal relation to creatures, which means that God is capable of change
and growth. God is the ultimate example of a relational being drawing persons toward self-crea tion . This creativity is the imago dei. God
and creat ures are mutually dependent. God is a part of the universe
and not ontologically different from creatures. God's glory is increased through his relation with man. This is a way to understand
what God tells Moses: "And as one ea rth shall pass away. and the
heavens thereof even so shall another come; and there is no end to
my works, neither to my words. For behold, this is my work and my
glory-to bring to pass the immortality and eternal life of man"
(Moses 1:38-39). God's very purpose in existence ca n only be ful filled in relation to others. The Ru ssian existentialist theologian
Nicolas Berdyaev describes the necessity of relation in terms of love
and friendship:
This is the rea l tragedy o f the world and of God. God longs
for His "other," His friend; He wants him to answe r the call
to enter the fullness of the divine life and participate in
God's creative work of conquering non-being.2?
The tragedy to which Berdyaev refers is the fact that love requires a
free response. The ultimate purpose of creation is the creation of real
26. Ibid.
27. lkrdyaev. The Deslitly ofMlm. 26.
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relationships. God, as a person, presupposes his other, his fri end, his
beloved. This "other" must in some sense be God's eq ual. But the
other can choose not to respond or to rebel. Love is a free response; it
cannot be forced. As the seven teenth ~ce ntur y Germa n mystic and dia lectical theist Jacob Boehme was fond of say in g, "God wanted chil dren, not serfs."
Beckwith and Parrish repeatedly argue that, since the Mormon
God creates from previously existing chaos, God will even tu ally run
out of material. But this is to assert that there is no notion of crea tivity possible for Mormons (see pp. 114-IS). For Berdyaev, like the
process theologian s, God 's crea tivity and dialectical na ture necessa rily mean that God is not the metaphysical ultimate.28 In Science
and the Modern World, Whitehead argues that if God were the metaphys ical ultimate, the ground of all being, God wou ld also be th e
source of evil: "I f this concepti on be adhered to, there can be no alternative except to discern in Him the origin of all evil as well as of
all good. He is then the supreme auth or of th e play. and to Him
therefore must be ascribed its shortcomings as well as its success."19
Whitehead contends instead that creativ ity is the metaphysical ultimate and is a characterist ic of the universc. 3o This is why process theology rejects creation ex lIihilo. God engages in mutual creative ac tion with creatures, thereby bringing creation from chaos to cosmos.
But to assert that creativity is the metaphysical ultimate is not to say
that something greate r tha n God exists. Nicolas Be rdyaev explains
28. John Cobb, A Ch ristian Natur(J/ rheology: Hilsed 011 the Tlrougirl of AlfmJ NOr/I!
Whitehead (Philadelprua: Westminster, 1974), 142.
29. Alfred North Whitehead, Seie ,,,e lind Ihe Mode", World (New Yo rk: Mentor
Books,I948),179.
30. Cobb, A Chrisrum /l/flI llral71te%£y, 206, points out that Wh itehead never argues
that creativity "exists~ but that it is a characteristic of actual entities.
Creativity is specificall y described as one of the ultimate notions that along
with U many~ and "on(~ are " involved in the meaning of the synonymous terms
'thing,' 'being,' and 'ent ity.'~ We can not think of an entity except as a unit of
self-creativity in which the ma ny factors of the universe become o ne individual
thing whkh then becomes a part of th e many for creative syn th esis into a new
ont'.
In the samt' sense, no Mormon would thin k that agency "exists but would insist that we
cannot think of intelligencu except as agents.
M
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that creativ it y (Bcrdyaev uses the term meonic freedom ) is creation
from nothing in the sense of no-thing. It is undetermined freedom,
the open future from which we create meaning in our lives. This "no th ing" is a property of God and of all beings. Be ing is therefore not
static but dynamic and growing. What we have in philosophers like
Berdyaev and Wh itehead is a conception of matter that is dynamic.
This is far from the nineteenth-centu ry materialism of dead atoms
that Beckw ith and Parrish ca ll materialism . Similarly, in the King
Folle l Discourse Joseph Smith explicitly rejects creation ex nihilo.
God cannot be omnipotent in the traditional sense because God canno t crea te or destroy the " pure prirl ciples of element" (emphasis
added ).
Now, the word create ca me from th e word baurau wh ich
does not mean to create out of nothing; it means to organize;
the same as a man wou ld organize materials and bu ild a
ship. Hence. we infer that God had materials to organize the
world out of chaos-chaotic matter, which is element, and in
which dwells all the glory. Element had an existence from the
time he had. T he pure principles of element are principles
which can never be destroyed; they may be organized and reorganized, but not destroyed. They had no beginning, and
can have no end."
For Whi tehead and Berdyaev the history of Christ ianity constitutes a tragic fa il ure precisely because it has tried to make God the
sole ground of all being. Christ ian theology apostatized from its
Galilean origins. The failure co nsisted in see in g God as the divine
despot imposing laws on the world. Christian theology, as valuable as
it is and has been for the growth of Western civilizat ion, has conceived God as a coercive power in the form of a Roman emperor or
Byzantine basi/eus. In Adventures of fdeas, Whitehead calls for a return to the original intuitions of Christ ianity, which are much nearer
to persuasion and the aims of civilization. n Christian ity failed when

--------------------------------31 . 1~u(hiugs "f Ille Proplret loserll Smit/r, 350.
32. Alfred North Whitehead. A,/venlr;re, of Ideus (New York: Fr~ Press, 1967), 169,
writes: uThe nature o r God was exempted rrom all the metaphysical categories which
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it cut the finite off from God and created an infi nite gulf between
God and the world. God became Caesar. God became eminently real,
but the worl d was derivative. God was necessary to the world, but the
world was not necessary to God. Mysticism beca me the only way to
bridge the gulf: the only way to experience God existed on the fringe
oftheology.33 Personalist and fi nitist theolog ian Bright man att ributes
this to the worship of power-class ical theology was formulated in
relation to the classica l notion of perfection that was ready to sacrifice God's perfection in goodness to perfect ion in powe r.
There is no thing worthy o f worsh ip in powe r as such; only
the powe r of the good is adorable, and it is adorable because
it is good ra ther tha n beca use it is power. God is the goodness of the universe. If the re is powe r for eviL it cannot be
the will of God. 34
Like Macquarrie, process philosophe r Cha rles Hartshorne claims
that the fa ilure of trad itional Ch ristian theology is based, in part, on
a monopolar idea of dei ty that views God only in tums of attributes
like eternity, simplicity, im passivity, and omni potence. This led theolog ians like 51. Ansel m to rejec t compassion as an inhe rent part of
God's nature because if God is moved by our suffering an d thus
changes in some respects, God would have to cha nge in alt respec ts.
If God's perfection is defined as changelessness, then God cannot be
compass ionate, for to be compassiona te is to be moved, or cha nged,
by a nothe r's mise ry. Har tsho rne argues that the trad ition has only
emphasized one pole of reality (cha ngelcss, self-sufficient, CIC.), ascribi ng such attribu tes to deity while grant ing on ly derivative reality
to the other pole (temporality, relat ion, etc.). He contends that God

- - - - - - - - _ ... _ - - - - - . , .
apply to the- individual things in thi s tempura l world. Thl' concept of him was a suolim:llion from ils barbaric origin. He stood in the sa me rel;ltion to the whole World as e ~rl y
Egyptian or Mesopotamian kings stood to their subject populations. A]so th e mural characters werc very analogous.~
33. Ibid., 173.
34 . Edgar S. Brightlllan, A PlrilMOplry of ReligiDtI (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice·
Hal!,1940),319.
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must be see n as the preeminen t exa mple of both poles. Hartshorne's
division of the poles looks something like this:
Classical Divinity

Creat ures or Created Beings

(perfect being)
being itself, infinite
necessary
independent
absolute
pure act
impassible
changeless
eternal (nunc slam)

(defi cient being)
fin ite
contingent
dependent
relative
potenlialily
passIve
changing
temporal (rume fluens )

Process theology is concerned with the religious sense of perfec tion .
Hartshorn e accepts from Anselm the idea that God (perfe ctio n) is
that which is supremely worshipful, estimable, unsurpassably great:
that being than whom none is greater and who ca n be surpassed by
none. However, Anselm's traditional notion of perfection eliminates
the second column of attributes from the divine nature. But, the
process theologian as ks. are dependence, relatedn ess, potentia li ty,
change, tempo rali ty, and so forth always deficient attributes? For the
trad itional theologian , change cannot be allowed in the conception
of the perfect being. He reasons as follows: If God changes, he
chan ges either for the worse or for the better. If for the worse, we
canno t admi re God without exception, for God is no longer what
God was. If God chan ges for the better. we must say God lacked
somet hin g. Therefore, cha nge cannot be allowed in God. But Hartshorne argues that there is really no reason to su ppose this. Is not divinit y supre mely worthy of worship and admiration if it undergoes
increasing change for the better? Consider, do we admire someo ne
less because we know that he or she would be happier tomorrow because his or her daughter wou ld be cu red of a present affli ction? If
God rejoices less today than he or she wou ld tomorrow if the world
were better, would we admire God less? Or, is all independence admirable? If God is depe ndent in any way. do we admi re him or her
less? Hartshorne's point is that in almost every way that we conceive
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of perfection in relation to creatures, dependence and relatedness are
valued as perfections. In the world as we know it, the higher the being,
the greater the dependence, indebtedness, sensitiv ity, and pertu rbabili ty.
Imag in e someone to read aloud an eloquent poem in the
presence of: (a) a glass of wate r, (b) an ant. (c) a dog, (d) a
human bei ng unacq uainted wit h the language of the poem,
(e) a hu man being knowing the la nguage but insensi tive to
poetry, (f) a person sensitive to poetry and fa miliar with the
language.J5
We norma lly regard those beings that are the most open to in fl uence as the most perfect. Process theology no tes tha t the grea ter the
power we ascribe to creatures, th e greater ou r concept of God as the
author of creatu res.
Can we worship a God who does no t have profou nd sy m pat hy
for our misery? Can we worship a God who does not rejo ice in ou r
joys and is not moved by the t ragedies of the wortd? The on tolog ical
pres uppos ition of nonrda ti vity and impassiv ity (p ure act, e tc.) in
God precludes a personal relationsh ip betwee n God and the world.
Process theology therefo re assigns to div ini ty a d ipolar nat ure; that
is, necessary and cont ingent aspects comp ri se divin ity, and th rough
the latter God is necessarily related to the world.
I bel ieve Joseph Sm ith clea rly rejected the class ical conception of
God. But like Berdyaev, Brightman, Hartshorn e, a nd Whitehead. he
rejected it for moral reasons tha t are fa r more Christ ian than cu ltist.
The LDS doctri ne of the relati on of God and persons concerns the
literal humanity of God and the potential divinity of hu man beings.
Joseph Sm ith set out this doctrine most clea rly in his 1844 funera l
sermon for Ki ng Follet:
God h imsel f was once as we a rc now, and is a n exa lled
man. and sits enthroned in yon der heavens! T hat is the great
secret. If the ve il we re rent today, and the grea t God who

- - - - - - -------- -

- - - --

35. Charles Hartshorne, Tire /)ivirr l.' R1'Imir'iry: 1\ S"dlrl ConCCf>liOIl o[(;ml ( New
Haven: Yale University Pre55, ]948). 49.
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holds this world in its orbit, and who upholds all worlds and
all things by his power, was to make himself visible,-I say, if
you were to see him today. you would see him like a man in
form-like yourselves in all the person, image, and very form
as a man.36

And
r am dwelling on the immortality of the spirit of man. Is
it logical to say that the intelligence of spirits is immortal,
and yet that it had a beginning? The intelligence of sp irits
had no beginning, neither wiU it have an end. That is good
logic. That which has a beginning may have an end. There
never was a time when there were not spirits; for they are coequal [co-eternaIJ with our Father in heaven ....
Intelligence is eternal and exists upon a self-existent principle. It is a spirit from age to age, and there is no creation
about it. All the minds and spirits that God ever sent into the
world are susceptible of enlargement. ...
The first principles of man are self-existent with God.
God himself, fmding he was in the midst of spirits and glory,
because he was more intelligent, saw proper to institute laws
whereby the rest could have a privilege to advance like
himself.3 7
Joseph Smith claimed to base this concept jon of God on divine revelation. What is envisaged is a divine community, with God leading
others to a fulness of life.
Beckwith and Parrish say repeatedly that Mormons are polytheists and cite B. H. Roberts in support of that notion (see pp. 98-99).
But Muslims and Jews have said the same about the Christian doctrine
J6. Te.tlchings of the Prophet JU5qJh Smith, 345.
37. Ibid., 353-54. Here: God is (Onc(ive:d to be: a JitnaJ father of spi rits; the logical
coroUary, attributed to Joseph Smith and espoused by the Mormon poet/prophetess Eliza R.
Snow, was that there is also a literal mother in heaven. A:; early as 1839 the Prophet Joseph
Smith taught the concept of an eternal mother, as reportc<l in several accounts from that
period. See Jill M. Den, ~The Significance of'O My Father' in the Personal Journey of
Eliza R. Snow," BYU $ludie5 3$11 ( 1996-97): 98--99.
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of the Trinity. and Christians have always rejected the label. Similarly,
Roberts asserted that Joseph Smith's doctrine of the coe ternality of
God and persons is not polytheism. J8 Roberts developed an idea of
the oneness of God through what he calls the "generic idea of God ,"
in which humanity participates in the Divine Nature. In th is sense
God is defined as human beings who have arrived at an identification
with basic real ity, be in gs who have become morally perfect. The
Divine Nature is One.
Man being by th e very nature o f him a son of God, and a
participant in the Divine Natu re-he is properly a part of
God; that is, when God is conceived of in the generic sense,
as made up of the whole assemblage of divine Intelligences
that exist in aU heavens and all earths. 39
Elsewhere Roberts notes th e interrelationship between God, the
supreme intelligence, and other intelligences, or God's children . This
relation is mutually dependent; God cannot be perfect without them
nor they without God. For Mormons, the process theologians, and
Berdyaev, the freedom or creativity of beings is the metaphysica l ultimate. Creativity/freedom does not "exist" but is the essential characteristic of persons (intelligences). This is the signifi cance of Roberts's
generic idea of God.
To th is Supreme Intelligence are the other intelligences necessary. He without them cannot be perfect, nor they without
him. There is communit y of interest between them; also of
love and brotherhood ; and hence co mmunity of effort for
mutual good, for progress, for attain ment of the highest pos sible. Therefore are these eternal, Divine Intelligences drawn
together in oneness of m ind and purpose-in moral and
spiritual unity.40
38. B. H . Robe rts, The MOTnulII Doctrine of Deity (Salt Lake City: Deseret Ncws Prcss,
1903), 163. Quoting Mormo n scri pture. Roberts affirms that ~ M an was also ... in the beginning wilh God. Intelligence ... was not created or made. neither indeed can be ....
(Doc. and Cov., sec 93: 29-35).~
39. Ibid., 166.
40. Comprr:htmivt Hiltory of/he Church. 2:399.
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Thus, thought Roberts, Mormon doctrine asserts the importance of
community for God to be God.
Process theologian David Griffin claims tha t Chr istians can share
a generic idea of God. "God is (I) the Supreme Power, (2) the personal, purposive creator of our world, who is (3) perfectly good, (4) the
source of moral norms, (5) the ultimate guaran tee for the meaningfulness of human life, (6) ground for the hope in the ultimate victory
over evil, (7) alone worthy of worsh ip."4 I Mormons could agree with
Professor Griffin on this concept ion of God that does not require
creat ion ex nihi/o or coercive divine omnipotence. This also places
God wit h us, within the universe. This is quite diffe rent from the
classical idea of the relation of God and the world in which the only
reason that anyth ing and everything (incl uding evil) exists is solely
the omnipotent will ofGod. 42
Griffin argues that many contemporary problems of nuclearism
and imperialism a rc related to this worsh ip a nd imitat ion of raw
power, because human beings try to imitate what they regard as ultimately real-powe r. Mormons shou ld find this ana lysis appealing
because it is so st rikingly simila r to the reason for the rejection of
Satan, the fa ther of lies, given in Mormon scripture. The power of
evi l is coercive. In section 12 1 of the Doctrine and Covenants, coercion is ruled out as a possible righteous act ivity of either human beings or God. In the Pearl of Great Price, Satan advocates the assertion
of raw power to coerce moral sanctity from humanity (see Abraham 3).
God and Christ reject this proposal in favor of pe rsuasion and
agency for al l. There is a strong sense in LDS doctri ne that Satan's
coerc ive plan is a lie from the beginning because it is a rejection of
reality itself, which is based on the agency, creativity. and coeternality
of inteltigences. This idea of God as noncoercive is such an important
part of LOS doctr ine that in the Book of Mormon the prophet Alma
reminds us that, were God to coerce our repentance, even though
acting out of his mercy, mercy would rob justice and God would
"cease to be God" (Alma 42:13. 22, 25).
<\]. D3vid R. Griffin, GOfl ufld Re/ig iofl irl Ihe POSllfiotiern World (Al bany: State University of New York Press., ]989),77.
42. ]bid.,] 32.
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Eternal life is the life of a community whose love for each o ther
is at th e basis of reality itselr. In the Doc trin e and Covena nts this
eternal community is clea rly give n:
When the Savior shall appear we sha ll see him as he is.
We sha ll see that he is a man like ou rse lves. An d that sa me
soc iality which exists among us he re will exist among us
there. on ly it will be coupl ed with etern al glory, which glory
we do not now enjoy. (D&C 130: 1- 2)
In Mormon doctrine God is a "fellow suffe rer who understands."
God carcs, in part. because God. while a finite, human, person, devel oped compass io n through th e experience of temptat ion and suffe ring in human existence. God thus full y realizes how significant temptation and suffe ring a rc for human bein gs beca use he exper ien ced
mortality. The prophet Alma explains that it is on ly th rough the experience of the tem ptat ions and sufferin g of human existence that
Ch rist could become fully compassionate, fully loving, fully moral:
And he will take upon him death, that he may loose the
bands of death which bind his people; and he will take upon
him their infirmities. that his bowels may be filled with
mercy, acco rding to the fl esh. tha I he may know according to
the fIesh how to succor his people accord ing to their infirmi ties. (Al ma 7: 12)
For Al ma, Christ ca nnot fully understand the sufferi ng of this wo rld
until he becomes embodied and thus fully human. Joseph Smith and
B. H. Robe rts describe God as a pe rso n, morally perfeCied in love.
who is fully related to other persons. A part of this pe rfection has
been the experience of life as a finite individual with all the tempta tions and imperfections. God suffers with us. If love that inclu des
shou ldering the burden of others is C hristia n, then Mormonism is
not only a Christian religion but, by the most important standards, is
profoundly Ch ristian .
I do nol pretend that the brief skett;h of a dia lectical theism that I
have presented in the last sect ion of this paper is "The Mormon
T heology." I o nly offer it ,IS a poss ible response to the cri tiq ul' of LOS
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beliefs by classical theists. As I said at the beginning of this review,
the LDS faith is a religion and as a religion has many possible theo logical and philosophical interpretations. This awareness of the possibilities of interpretation is a sense of philosoph ical humility that
philosophers who deem themselves Ch ristian should have before a
God whom we see "as through a glass darkJy" as we await the fulness
of revelation.
Finally, See the Gods Fall suffers from one great problem, a lack of
faith in the viability of Christianity. This is illustrated by the fact that
the first two chapters, where the authors limit themselves to an at tempt to explain and defend traditional theism. are the strongest and
the most interesting in the book. I don't agree with them, but a dialogue could take place between Latter-day Saints, New Age believers.
Baha'is, and evangelical Ch ristians on the basis of what Beckwith and
Parrish have written in these chapters. This is so because at this point
Beckwith and Parrish are trying to explain as clearly as possible just
what it is that they believe. It is after this that they enter waters that
they seem to have little idea how to navigate. It is ironic that Christians should think that the best way to defend Christianity is to give
such prejudiced versions of the beliefs of others of God's children. If
Christianity is true, and I believe with all my being that it is, it should
be able to withstand the best of all other traditions, admitting all that
is true and of eternal value in each of them.

